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Abstract
In this paper we analyse countercyclical ﬁscal policy within
the context of a microfounded analysis of business cycle stabil-
isation. We show that tax and spending instruments can have
a useful counter cyclical role, even after allowing for the distor-
tionary nature of the instruments and the need for debt sustain-
ability. A critical barrier to the use of ﬁscal instruments may
be political economy concerns, and we survey recent suggestions
involving alternative ﬁscal policy institutions.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the last few decades the public debate on macroeconomic ﬁscal policy
has been on the size of public debt and deﬁcits, rather than on business
cycle stabilisation. However, with a number of countries entering Euro-
pean Monetary Union (and some still thinking about it), the potential
stabilisation role for ﬁscal policy has resurfaced. In addition, the acad-
emic literature, which until recently has focused mainly on the role of
monetary policy for macroeconomic stabilisation and inﬂation control,
has now begun to look at how ﬁscal policy could in principle complement
monetary policy.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 1 we will review recent
developments in the theory of business cycle stabilisation. We show how
1the analysis of traditional ‘Keynesian’ style policy has been integrated
and reinterpreted in a framework with an explicit measure of welfare
derived from optimising agents. In section 2 we use this framework to
compare how monetary and ﬁscal policy can be used for macroeconomic
stabilisation, either individually or jointly. This section deals with two
‘complications’ typically associated with ﬁscal stabilisation: tax distor-
tions and government debt. We show that the neither necessarily rules
out the use of ﬁscal policy for stabilisation purposes - indeed it is often
the distortionary nature of ﬁscal instruments that gives them a potential
stabilisation role within this framework. Despite this, many will be du-
bious about countercyclical ﬁscal policy on political economy grounds,
arguing that any attempt to use ﬁscal policy to stabilise the business
cycle may weaken the already fragile incentives for policy makers to
control budget deﬁcits and debt. This has led some to argue for new
institutional arrangements for ﬁscal policy, and we review some of these
proposals in section 3. A ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Business Cycle Stabilisation
The modern approach to monetary policy is at heart quite straightfor-
ward. Policy has a role in managing the business cycle to the extent that
that cycle is a result of a distortion caused by price rigidity/nominal in-
ertia. The impact of the distortion can be measured explicitly by consid-
ering the utility of a representative agent, from which can be derived the
objectives of policy makers. Thus a traditional Keynesian approach has
become microfounded. One of the advantages of microfounding coun-
tercyclical policy in this way is that the beneﬁts of stabilisation can be
quantitatively compared to other aspects of budgetry policy, such as the
distortionary impact of taxes, and this the literature is beginning to do.
One potential disadvantage is that some complexities of real life, such
as ﬁnancial market ineﬃciencies, liquidity constraints or unemployment,
may be diﬃcult to model within this paradigm.
We can illustrate many of the points in this paper by looking at a very
simple model of a closed economy. Typically in microfounded macroeco-








s−t[u(Cs,G s;ξs) − v(ys(z),ξs)] (1)
i.e. maximise discounted utility by choosing paths for aggregate con-
sumption and labour supply. In (1) β is a discount factor, C is consump-
tion of a an aggregate bundle of goods, G is an exogenously determined
bundle of public goods, ξ is a vector of shocks to utility, v represents
2both the disutility of providing labour to produce a particular good z
and the production technology required to transform labour to output1.
While standard, this form of utility function already embodies a cru-
cial, if realistic assumption. While individuals are able to cushion some,
but not all, of the impact of changes in the relative price of particular
consumer goods on their utility by varying their consumption basket,
they are tied to one particular good in supplying labour. As a result,
they cannot avoid the consequences of being employed in a ‘recession
industry’ by allocating some of their ‘spare labour’ to boom industries2.
By assuming full ﬁnancial markets so that workers all enjoy the same
marginal utility of consumption3,a n dt h a tu is separable in C and G,
maximising utility subject to a budget constraint implies that aggregate












where i is the nominal interest rate, and P the consumer price level.4 It
is perhaps more familiar in its log-linearised form
ct = Et[ct+1] − σ(it − Et[πt+1]) − ξt + βEt[ξt+1]
where π is inﬂation, and σ is the intertemporal elasticity of consumption.
The other ﬁrst order condition relates the marginal utility of consump-
1S i n c ew ea r ee x a m i n i n gﬂuctuations at the business cycle frequency as a result
shocks in the presence of nominal inertia we, in common with the literature, ignore
capital. Woodford (2003) argues that this does not fundamentally aﬀect the analysis.
2However, it should be noted that even if workers were able to allocate labour to
many diﬀerent ﬁrms, price dispersion would still increase the disutility of producing
a given level of aggregate consumption, given the diminishing marginal product of
labour within each ﬁrm’s production function and the diminishing marginal utility
of individual goods within the consumer’s consumption basket. Nevertheless, the
utility costs of price dispersion will clearly be greater when workers are tied to ﬁrms
(see Woodford (2003), pp 163-173) since this increases the strategic complementarity
between ﬁrms’ pricing decisions.
3Implicitly we are assuming that at the point these contracts were written all con-
sumers enjoyed the same expected human and non-human wealth. Any subsequent
diﬀerences in income as a result of staggered wage and/or price setting are exactly
compensated for as part of the contracts.
4It should be noted that the complete ﬁnancial markets do not imply that we are
ignoring uncertainty. Insurance against idiosyncratic shocks means that consumers
compensate each other for any diﬀerences in the impact on their budget constraints
of shocks arising from the random ability of their ﬁrm to reset its price, or their own
ability to renegotiate their wage if wages are also sticky. However, consumers are not
insured for aggregate shocks, giving policy makers an incentive to reduce business
cycle ﬂuctuations.






where τt is the tax rate on labour income.
The consumption aggregate is made up of a continuum of individual
goods, where preferences between goods are CES in structure (following
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)). The market for each individual good is therefore
imperfectly competitive, and each producer of good z faces the following





− (C + G)
We can link output and employment using a simple linear production
technology
y(z)=Ah(z)
where A is a stochastic parameter representing the level of technology.
A role for countercyclical monetary policy is introduced by assuming
that the prices set by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms are sticky, typ-
ically through the mechanism of Calvo (1983) contracts whereby prices
can only be adjusted after a random interval of time. This gives rise
to the description of aggregate supply embodied in the New Keynesian
Phillips curve5,
πt = βEtπt+1 + κln(mct + µ)+ut
where mc is a measure of real marginal costs (which will involve the real
wage deﬁn e da b o v e ,a sw e l la sp r o d u c t i v i t y ,s a l e st a x e s( υ), income taxes
(τ) and a production subsidy), and µ is the ﬁrm’s mark-up (based on the
the elasticity of demand  ). If prices were ﬂexible, mc = −µ.W ed e ﬁne
an error term u as a ‘cost-push’ shock. This shock can be rationalised
in various ways, such as changes in the desired mark-up of monopolistic
ﬁrms, perhaps due to stochastic variations in the demand elasticty. In
the absence of labour market frictions (such as nominal wage inertia and
habit eﬀects in labour supply) this can be rewritten in the more familiar
form,
πt = βEtπt+1+κ(α1 lnY
g





where Y g = Y/Yn denotes the output ’gap’: the ratio of the level of
output to its level that would occur if prices were completely ﬂexible
5Recent work has given econometric support for this model of price-setting (see
Leith and Malley (2005) for example).
4(its ‘natural’ level) . For tax policy instruments, natural levels refer to
steady state levels. If there was no variation in tax rates or government
spending over the business cycle then the forcing variable in this Phillips
curve would be the output gap. Note that the impact of sales and income
taxes on inﬂation is the same when only prices are sticky. However, as
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005b) show, in the presence of both sticky wages
and prices, income and sales taxes will aﬀect the ‘costs’ driving wage and
price inﬂation, respectively.
The concept of a natural level of a variable plays a critical role in
the analysis. If the rationale for stabilisation policy is to correct the
distortion caused by nominal inertia, then the natural level of output -
w h a to u t p u tw o u l db ei fp r i c e sw e r ef u l l yﬂexible - represents an obvious
policy target. Unfortunately, nominal inertia is not the only distortion
in this model. The introduction of monopolistic competition through
Calvo contracts introduces a permanent distortion into the economy:
output is lower than it would be under perfect competition. Sales and
income taxes are also distortionary. This complicates the analysis, as
there may be a temptation for policy to try and eliminate the eﬀects
of these distortions (i.e. output below its perfectly competitive level)
as well as the eﬀects of nominal inertia. This leads to the well known
problem of inﬂation bias, analysed by Barro and Gordon (1982) and
many others. To focus on pure stabilisation issues, we can abstract from
this problem by assuming that there is in place a production subsidy
which exactly oﬀsets the steady state impact of monopolistic and tax
distortions6.
The ﬁnal step in the analysis is to specify the objectives of policy.
(The government’s budget constraint is considered in the next section.)
As agents diﬀer only to the extent that they work in diﬀerent industries,
a benevolent policy maker will maximise the aggregate of (1) across indi-
viduals/goods. Taking a second order expansion, and after considerable
manipulation, we can write welfare as
W = A1π
2 + A2(lnY − lnY
n)
2 + A3(lnG − lnG
n)
2 + tip (2)
where Ai are combinations of model parameters (and are all negative),
π is inﬂation, and tip represents terms that are independent of policy
6Alternatively we may retain the distortions, but assume that they are small (as
in Woodford (2003), Chapter 6) such that our objective function contains the squared
diﬀerence between the output gap and the extent to which the natural rate of output
is ineﬃciently low. Or we can treat the distortions as being signiﬁcant which means
we cannot enjoy the simplicity of forming a linear quadratic problem, but need to
take second order approximations of our model as well as welfare function to obtain
valid policy conclusions (see Sutherland (2004), for example).
5(i.e. terms involving the steady state or shocks alone) and terms higher
than second order.
How do we get from (1) involving consumption, government spend-
ing, output and preference shocks to the expression above? The ﬁrst,
and most important, point is how inﬂation appears. Expanding the
aggregate of utility across all agents introduces a term in the variance
of output across goods. The intuition is straightforward. Firstly, from
the form of the consumption basket, price dispersion reduces the utility
generated by production of goods from a given level of labour input as
the utility generated by extra consumption of cheaper goods does not
compensate for the reduced consumption of the more expensive goods
due to diminishing marginal utility for individual goods. Additionally,
under any of the following conditions: (1)the ﬁrm has a convex pro-
duction function; (2)workers suﬀer from increasing disutility of labour
supply; and, (3) workers are tied to working in a single industry, varia-
tion in output across ﬁrms and industries that are not a result of changes
in preferences to work will have costs, even if aggregate output is un-
changed.
Why does output diﬀer across industries? In this analysis, the only
reason is that ﬁrms set prices at diﬀerent times because of menu costs in
the manner suggested by Calvo contracts. Woodford (2003) shows that,
under Calvo contracts, the variance of output is directly related to the
level of inﬂation. Again the intuition is simple: the higher is inﬂation,
t h eg r e a t e rt h ec h a n g ei nr e l a t i v ep r i c e si n d u c e db ym e n uc o s t s ,a n d
therefore the greater the resulting variation in output across industries.
This is a particularly neat formalisation of an old idea, which is that
inﬂa t i o ni sc o s t l yb e c a u s ei ti n d u c e sr e l a t i v ep r i c em o v e m e n t st h a td o
not reﬂect changes in technology or tastes. This is the only reason why
inﬂation matters in this set up. The immediate implication is that the
optimal rate of inﬂation is zero.
A second key step in obtaining (2) is the elimination of linear terms
in consumption, government spending and output. These terms arise
because more consumption is better, but people would like to work less,
ceteris paribus. Of course the terms are linked: higher consumption re-
quires more work. Under the assumption noted earlier that a subsidy
exists that exactly counteracts the distortion due to monopolistic compe-
tition and taxes, and assuming that the steady state provision of public
goods is optimal, we can use the ﬁrst order conditions that follow from
individuals maximising (1) to eliminate linear terms. If we do not make
this, or some similar, assumption, then a linear term will remain in the
objective function, implying that it is optimal for the policy maker to
raise output above steady state permanently.
6Third and ﬁnally, what about the terms in 1 involving preference
shocks (ξ)? These have been eliminated by the concept of the ‘natural’
level of a variable discussed above. As we noted with the Phillips curve,
this device of natural levels allows us to diﬀerentiate between movements
generated by preferences or technology (which do not in themselves re-
quire a policy response), and those due to distortions which generate
social costs which policy may be able to oﬀset.
Equation (2) is close to the traditional form of objective function
used in much macroeconomic analysis. However, whereas traditional
analysis left the relative importance of inﬂation viz the output gap (i.e.
A1/A2) up to policy makers, here it comes directly from the parameters
of the model. In addition, output appears in the form of the output gap.
The important but straightforward point is that policy makers should
not attempt to stabilise output around its steady state, but instead
accommodate deviations in steady state that represent preference or
technology shocks. Note that government spending gaps also matter,
because if the provision of public goods diﬀers from its natural (assumed
optimal) level, welfare will deteriorate.
By using a subsidy to eliminate the monopolistic distortion, we have
ensured that the optimal level of steady state output is its natural level,
which is also the steady state level of output if inﬂation is zero. We have
also noted above that the optimum level of inﬂation is zero, because this
eliminates any misallocation because prices adjust at diﬀerent times.
There is therefore no reason for macroeconomic policy to attempt to in-
ﬂuence the steady state of the economy, beyond ensuring that inﬂation
is zero. However, nominal inertia will mean that the economy may devi-
ate from its eﬃcient level when it is hit by shocks, and macroeconomic
policy can attempt to minimise these deviations.
We have identiﬁed three types of shock in this model: preference
shocks, technology shocks and cost-push shocks. However, in this very
simple closed economy set-up, the ﬁrst two shocks need not lead to
any deviation from the ﬂexible price equilibrium (i.e. gap variables can
remain zero), provided monetary policy is set optimally. The intuition
for this is that both preference shocks and technology shocks are real
shocks, which do not necessarily require any change in nominal prices
to bring about changes in real magnitudes. As long as nominal interest
rates move with the natural interest rate (the natural interest rate will
change as a result of these shocks), then inﬂation can remain zero. For
example, a positive technology shock will decrease the natural rate of
interest such that, if monetary policy changes interest rates in line with
the natural interest rate, this will create demand for the additional goods
without requiring a fall in the priceo ft h e s eg o o d s . As i m p l er u l ef o r
7monetary policy that will bring this about7 is
i = r
n +( 1+µ)πµ > 0
In contrast, cost-push shocks cannot be completely overcome in this
way, and so they will lead to disequilibrium even if monetary policy is
optimal (see Clarida et al (1999) for example.) We can see this imme-
diately by considering the Phillips curve: a non-zero value for u cannot
be consistent with zero inﬂation and a zero output gap. However, the
particular combination of inﬂation and output disequilibrium caused by
this shock is unlikely to be optimal (i.e. it will not minimise (2)), and
so policy will have a role in adjusting the output/inﬂation trade-oﬀ to
achieve this optimal disequilibrium combination.
If monetary policy is the only policy instrument, therefore, at least
cost-push shocks will lead to welfare costs, even if policy is set opti-
mally. Additionally, the result that technology and preference shocks
are potentially benign no longer holds once we introduce wage inertia
alongside price inertia into the model. This is because either shock will
require a change in real wages, and hence nominal wages and/or prices,
and so we immediately encounter the nominal inertia distortions. How-
ever, it may be possible to utilise ﬁscal instruments to oﬀset the welfare
consequences of shocks in these, more complex, cases - we discuss this
possibility below.
Open economies and monetary unions Do the results noted above
continue to apply in an open economy? The answer is broadly yes, al-
though potentially there are additional complications that can only be
avoided in rather special circumstances. In particular, the assumptions
required to prevent either the exchange rate or consumption appearing
as an additional variable in 2 are quite strong. Kirsonova et al (2003)
discuss these, and in particular show that if we allow for shocks to Uncov-
ered Interest Parity or International Risk Sharing then the open economy
welfare function is likely to contain terms related to real exchange rate
disequilibrium, in contrast to Gali and Monacelli (2004).
Another interesting aspect of an open economy analysis is that the
inﬂation measure in the social welfare function is the change in the price
of output, not consumer price, inﬂation. Consumers can reduce the costs
of relative price variability through substitution, but workers tied to one
particular good cannot. As the costs of inﬂation therefore impinge on
labour supply, it is output price inﬂation rather than consumer price
inﬂation that matters for welfare.
7µ must be greater than zero to eliminate the possibility of self-fulﬁlling increases
in inﬂationary expectations, even although in the face of technology and preference
shocks inﬂation will remain zero.
8However, neither of these points has a direct bearing on any coun-
tercyclical role for ﬁscal policy. Many of the results noted above for a
closed economy continue to hold. If the only source of nominal iner-
tia is price rigidity, then both preference and technology shocks can in
principle be completely oﬀset using monetary policy, but this is not the
case for cost-push shocks. Furthermore, if we introduce nominal inertia
in wage setting, then preference and technology shocks, like cost push
shocks, cannot be completely eliminated by monetary policy alone.
The major diﬀerence in considering policy in an individual member
of a monetary union is of course the absence of monetary policy, and
the problem this poses in the face of asymmetric shocks, or diﬀerent
economic responses to symmetric shocks. Even without wage inertia,
both preference and technology shocks will generate disequilibrium in an
individual member of a monetary union, if these shocks are idiosyncratic.
This is because, in an open economy under ﬁxed exchange rates, the real
exchange rate can only change through nominal prices changing, so we
inevitably encounter the nominal inertia distortion.
However, the derivation of a welfare based objective function will not
be fundamentally diﬀerent for a monetary union member compared to a
small open economy, even if ﬁscal rather than monetary policy is being
used as a stabilisation instrument. This is an important point, because
some discusion has suggested that any ﬁscal stabilisation by individual
union members should adopt a diﬀerent target variable (e.g. output)
from the variable targeted by the monetary authority (e.g. inﬂation)8.
In some circumstances, it might be possible to assign diﬀerent targets
to monetary and ﬁscal authorities, even though both authorities were
benevolant (and therefore cared about inﬂation and output gaps). In
Dixit and Lambertini (2003), for example, inﬂation is identical across all
union members. In these circumstances they show that, if the objectives
of national ﬁscal authorities and the union’s central bank are similar, and
in particular they agree about the level of natural output in each country,
then the ﬁrst best solution (inﬂation at target and output at its natural
rate) can always be achieved. In these circumstances, it is quite possible
to assign the inﬂation target to the central bank and national output
targets to the national ﬁscal authorities. However, in the more general
and realistic case where union members inﬂation rates may diﬀer, the
8The concept of a policy target is not well deﬁned. The term is used in variety
of ways, from the components of an objective function to a value of a variable that
must be met by policy makers unconditionally (e.g. money supply targets). The
usefulness of targets in the context of monetary policy is hotly contested, as the
current debate on inﬂation targets in the US illustrates. A discussion of these issues
goes well beyond the scope of this paper.
9welfare analysis cited above clearly shows that both domestic inﬂation
and output should be focus of any national ﬁscal stabilisation.
A more tricky issue involves whether national governments should
maximise the welfare of their own agents taking the policies of other
union members as given, or whether they should maximise their own
component of union wide welfare. The two policies will diﬀer, because in
the former case policy makers have an incentive to attempt to appreciate
the terms of trade (relative to other union members) to increase domestic
welfare. However, such a policy would be suboptimal from a union wide
perspective, for the obvious reason that the terms of trade of union
members relative to each other cannot all appreciate at once (see Gali
& Monacelli 2004b). Dixit and Lambertini (2003) also highlight the
importance of coordination on measuring the level of natural output.
Finally, in the context of monetary unions, we can note one possible
extension to the model that could radically increase the importance of
ﬁscal stabilisation. We note below how adding some price setters who
marked up prices using a rule of thumb based on past inﬂation could
introduce a backward looking element into the Phillips curve, and that
this would change the form of the social welfare function. Kirsanova,
Vines and Wren-Lewis (2005) show that it could also result in an econ-
omy developing severe cycles following an asymmertic shock. In such
circumstances, countercyclical ﬁscal policy may become a necessity.
Robustness Woodford’s analysis of welfare is sensitive to the form of
nominal inertia, as Woodford (2003) himself shows. Woodford (2003,
Chapter 6) discussing a number of alternatives to Calvo contracts, but
one particularly interesting case is if the group of ﬁrms that do not
set the optimal price in any particular period index their prices to last
period’s inﬂation rate, rather than keeping prices ﬁxed. This has the
eﬀect of introducing a backward-looking element to the Phillips curve.
In these circumstance, the variability of output across industries is no
longer fully captured by inﬂation, but will also depend on the change in
inﬂation. (See Steinsson, 2003 for detailed analysis of this case.)
Woodfood (2003) also explores the implications of adding monetary
frictions to the benchmark model by, for example, assuming that money
is a non-separable argument in utility. This implies that the objective
function would include a quadratic term in the interest rate. When
constructing an optimal policy based on an objective function which
contains such a term, it turns out that this implies a desire to smooth
movements in the policy instrument.
This line of analysis is still at an early stage. The results so far
suggest that, while any objective function will contain terms in output
disequilibria and output price inﬂation, it is unclear whether this is suf-
10ﬁcient in more complex and realistic models, and such models might
introduce additional terms into the benevolent policy maker’s objective
function. Although the analysis is abstract and simpliﬁed, it does clar-
ify the consequences of some basic economic ideas, such as the impact
of inﬂation on relative price variability. The emphasis on output price
inﬂation rather than consumer price inﬂation follows directly from this,
and at the very least raises a challenge for real world policies that are
based on consumer price inﬂation.
Other conclusions may be less robust, however. For example, Wood-
f o r d( 2 0 0 3 ,C h a p t e r6 )a r g u e st h a tr e a s o n a b l ec a l i b r a t i o n si m p l yt h a tA2
in (2) is small relative to A1 (a relative magnitude of the order of 0.05
to 1), implying that inﬂation is much more costly to social welfare than
output gaps. This is a variant on an older argument due to Lucas (see
Lucas 2003 for a restatement), which is that the costs of business cycles
due to consumers being oﬀ their optimal consumption path is small. It
is far from clear that this result would survive in a more realistic model
which allowed for unemployment. (In addition, there may be other im-
portant costs of inﬂation besides relative price distortions.) It would also
be interesting to re-examine the importance of the exchange rate gap in
models with both traded and non-traded goods.
3 Fiscal Policy as a Stabilisation Tool
In much of the discussuion above, policy involved moving the monetary
policy instrument so as to get as close as possible to the natural level
of output (the level that would occur under ﬂexible prices) and zero
inﬂation. This could done perfectly in the case of taste or technology
shocks when there was only one source of nominal inertia (wages or
prices). Such a ﬁrst best outcome is not achievable in the presence of
either cost push shocks, nominal inertia in wage setting or the case of
monetary union subject to idiosyncratic shocks of any kind. In principle,
in such situations, ﬁscal instruments could be utilised as well as (or in
the case of a monetary union, instead of) monetary policy to get closer
to the ﬁrst-best solution.
Therefore, we brieﬂy discuss how tax (sales and income taxes) and
spending instruments could, in theory, be used to oﬀset the kinds of
shocks discussed above. It is possible to generalise the above analysis
by including sticky wages as well as prices. As noted above, with these
two sources of nominal inertia, sales taxes enter the Phillips curve for
prices and income taxes enter the deﬁnition of ‘marginal costs’ for wage
inﬂation. Putting aside any debt sustainability issues for a moment,
it is clear that these instruments can in principle be altered to com-
pletely oﬀset the impact of any cost-push shock on either wage or price
11inﬂation. So, in at least this simple case, ﬁscal policy can enhance the
stabilisation role of monetary policy. In reality, the economy is likely to
be subject to many more distortionary shocks that may have macroeco-
nomic conseqences, and there may be additional tax instruments that
can mitigate these9. In the case of government spending acting as the
ﬁscal instrument, this aﬀects aggregate demand directly, and therefore,
in the context of monetary union, can potentially compensate for the
loss of the monetary policy instrument.
In the remainder of this section we will explicitly compare ﬁscal and
monetary policy instruments, with a view to assessing the desirability
of using ﬁscal variables in macroeconomic stabilisation. There are three
key aspects to this comparison: the role played by government debt, the
distortionary role of ﬁscal instruments and the political economy aspects
of the use of ﬁscal instruments. We consider each of these in turn.
The government budget constraint It seems natural to see the
government’s intertemporal budget constraint and government debt as
complications introduced by ﬁscal stabilisation, but which can be ignored
if we conﬁne ourselves to monetary policy. However this is incorrect, at
least in principle. Monetary policy has an impact on the government’s
budget constraint, because it changes the servicing cost of government
debt, because through inﬂation it alters the real value of government
debt, and because by changing output it alters the tax take. If ﬁscal
policy does nothing in response to these changes (by which we mean
that government spending and tax rates remain unchanged), then the
economy will either enter an unstable debt spiral, or it will enter a regime
similar to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (see Woodford (1998),
Leeper (1991), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000)). The latter outcome is
undesirable, as Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2005) among others show.
So a complete analysis of the impact of monetary policy has to include
its impact on government debt and the government’s budget constraint.
However, these issues are medium to long term, and so their impact on
short term stabilisation need not be large. A number of authors (e.g
Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000 and 2005a) have shown that quite weak
ﬁscal rules are suﬃcient to ensure long term ﬁscal sustainability, where
by weak we mean that spending and taxes only correct any debt dis-
equilibrium gradually. (Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2005) show in the
context of a closed economy that such weak rules are also optimal.) As
ar e s u l t ,ﬁscal stabilisation of debt may have very little impact on any
stabilisation policy, whether that policy is monetary or ﬁscal. In this
9The existence of multiple tax instruments has also led some to suggest that this
may be a more appropriate tool to deal with asset price bubbles than the monetary
policy instrument (see Muellbauer,2004, for example).
12sense, it is feasible to examine business cycle stabilisation independently
of the government’s budget constraint, and for that stabilisation to in-
volve both monetary or ﬁscal policy, as long as appropriate long term
debt control is in place.
The discussion above assumes that policy aims to return to some
steady state target for government debt. However recent studies have
suggested that even a ﬁx e dd e b tt a r g e to ft h i sk i n dm a yn o tb eo p t i m a l .
Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmit-Grobe and Uribe (2004) both
suggest that optimal debt policy may involve debt exhibiting random
walk behaviour. By this we mean that if some shock raises govern-
ment debt, it may be optimal to (at least in part) leave debt higher
permanently, rather than eventually bring it back to its original level.
The reason for this is that the costs of keeping debt permanently higher
(higher taxes, which add to distortions, or lower spending, which makes
public goods provision suboptimal) are discounted, and are therefore ﬁ-
nite. As a result, they may be outweighed by the short term costs of
adjusting taxes or spending to get debt back to its original level.
So a common result from the recent literature is that the control of
government debt can, and probably should, be a very gradual aﬀair. As
a result, control of government debt does not signiﬁcantly impact on
the possibility of either monetary or ﬁscal business cycle stabilisation.
However, an implicit assumption in this literature is that the ﬁscal au-
thorities can commit to stabilising the debt stock through the use of
ﬁscal instruments. In the absence of credible commitment technologies,
ﬁscal authorities may be tempted to pressurise the monetary authorities
to monetise the debt, thereby generating an inﬂationary bias problem.
T h er e s u l tt h a td e b ti sr e l a t i v e l yu n i m p o r t a n ti g n o r e st h i sa n do t h e rk e y
political economy considerations, and we address those in our discussion
of ﬁscal institutions.
Fiscal distortions In the analysis above, monetary policy could be
seen as having two roles. First, it ensures that the steady state inﬂation
rate is optimal (in the basic model above, zero). Second, in the face of
shocks, monetary policy adjusts to ensure that the impact on inﬂation
and output gaps is minimised. It can do this by setting the nominal
interest rate, because with nominal inertia changes in nominal rates
would lead to short term changes in real rates, and real interest rates
have an impact on demand by changing the intertemporal pattern of
consumption spending.
Setting the steady state inﬂation rate is a role unique to monetary
policy. By choosing some steady state interest rate (or alternatively some
money supply growth target) policy largely determines the steady state
inﬂation rate. (In a monetary union, the steady state inﬂation rate in
13an individual union member is set by the union wide inﬂation rate.) So
ﬁscal policy cannot normally substitut ef o rt h i sr o l e .H o w e v e r ,t h es h o r t
term stabilisation role for monetary policy can also be accomplished in
principle by ﬁscal instruments: in the model above, changes in govern-
ment spending in particular has a direct eﬀect on aggregate demand,
and so can help achieve the optimal inﬂation/output gap trade-oﬀ.
One important diﬀerence between ﬁscal instruments and monetary
policy is that ﬁscal instruments all have an impact on welfare, besides
any impact they might have on stabilisation. Changing government
spending distorts the optimal allocation of consumption between private
and public goods, and taxes are directly distortionary. This implies that
it is quite possible to build optimality theories about ﬁscal instruments
that are quite independent of any stabilisation role they may have: tax
smoothing is a well known example. However this alone does not imply
that ﬁscal instruments should not be used for stabilisation.
This can be seen most clearly when a distortionary tax can be used to
directly oﬀset the impact of a distortionary shock: the distortions oﬀset
each other to produce a ﬁrst best solution. For example, sales taxes can
be used to completely oﬀset the impact of a cost-push shock, and we
noted above that this was something that monetary policy cannot do.
Even in cases where a distortionary tax cannot completely eliminate
a distortionary shock, it may help reduce its impact, such that the net
eﬀect of the moderated shock and the distortionary tax change is sig-
niﬁcantly better than before. For example, suppose a technology shock
occurs in a model in which there is wage inertia as well as price iner-
tia. This inertia will mean that real wages adjust more slowly than is
socially optimal, and monetary policy alone will not be able to eliminate
this distortion.
The Table below is taken from some recent work (Leith and Wren-
Lewis, 2005b) where we analyse a 1% autocorrelated technology shock
in an economy of this kind where policy-makers can precommit10.I t
assumes in each case that monetary policy is optimal, but diﬀerent rows
and columns include or exclude optimal use of a particular ﬁscal policy
instrument. It shows how using all three ﬁscal instruments can com-
pletely eliminate the costs of sticky wages and prices in the face of this
shock, whereas using monetary policy alone leaves costs equivalent to
0.58% of one period’s steady-state level of consumption. Note that in
this case government spending is not a very eﬀective instrument, because
it acts in a similar way to monetary policy. In contrast, we ﬁnd the gov-
ernment spending is potentially more useful in dealing with asymmetric
10Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005b) also consider policy under discretion, but for this
shock the numbers are similar to the case of precommitment.
14shocks in a monetary union.
Table 1 - Consumption Costs of Technology Shock in an Open Economy.
No Taxes Income Tax Sales Tax Both Taxes
Govt Spending 0.5793 0.0673 0.0863 0
No Govt Spending 0.5804 0.0708 0.0915 0
Does microfounded analysis make countercyclical ﬁscal policy
more or less potent? In traditional Keynesian models, taxes were
important because they inﬂuenced personal disosable income, and there-
fore consumption. In contrast, this ‘income eﬀect’ of taxes in the model
above is unimportant, because of Ricardian Equivalence. Changing taxes
alters the intertemporal distribution of personal disposable income, but
this can and will be oﬀset by changes in saving by consumers in order to
achieve the optimal intertemporal allocation of spending. Part of the re-
ceived wisdom appears to be that this alone makes countercyclical ﬁscal
policy ineﬀective.
Our discussion above illustrates why this view is incorrect. Taxes
matter in the model above because they inﬂuence key relative prices: for
example, income taxes change the return from supplying labour. In this
sense, ﬁscal policy becomes much richer in microfounded models. Three
important conclusions follow.
1) It is illegitimate to treat ﬁscal policy as if it is a single instrument.
The three varieties of ﬁscal policy examined above are quite distinct.
This has a potential advantage once we recognise that business cycle
disequilibrium is unlikely to have a single cause. What is common to
this analysis of business cycles is the ‘propagation mechanism’: nominal
inertia (here in the form of Calvo contracts). However, this mechanism
can be initiated by a wide range of ‘shocks’: we identiﬁed three above
(preferences, technology and cost-push), but more complex models will
create additional possibilities. In these circumstumstances having a vari-
ety of instruments which impact on the macroeconomy in diﬀerent ways
is a distinct advantage.
2) It follows that the way ﬁscal policy instruments impact on the
economy is diﬀerent from monetary policy. Perhaps the ﬁscal policy
instrument that is closest to monetary policy in terms of how it inﬂuences
the economy is government spending, because both work by inﬂuencing
demand. Even in this case, however, there are important diﬀerences,
particularly in an open economy.
3) To the extent that the economy suﬀers from additional distortions,
such as liquidity constraints, such that Ricardian Equivalence does not
hold, then this provides an additional route by which ﬁscal actions can
inﬂuence the cycle.
15This leads to the following general conclusion. Unless monetary pol-
icy can completely eliminate the impact of particular shocks on the econ-
omy by itself, then ﬁscal instruments can complement the stabilisation
role of monetary policy. Although changing ﬁscal instruments will re-
sult in a welfare cost (because of a sub-optimal level of public goods
provision, or because taxes are distortionary), this may be more than
outweighed by a positive eﬀect they can have in reducing the distor-
tion caused by nominal inertia, and in some cases may enable policy to
directly counteract a distortionary shock.
Exactly how the two policies should work together remains relatively
unexplored11. In addition, any realistic analysis would need to incorpo-
rate some of the rigidities associated with ﬁscal actions: unlike monetary
policy, tax rates or government spending cannot be changed overnight.
Using the welfare based analysis outlined above allows us to directly
measure the extent to which lags in the implementation of ﬁscal policy
may negate the beneﬁts of ﬁscal stabilisation. Such an analysis may also
suggest some form of target zone approach, where ﬁscal policy is only
changed if disequilibrium becomes large.12
4 Fiscal Policy Institutions
One of the striking results discussed above is the separation that can in
principle be achieved between two potential roles for ﬁscal policy: the
medium to long term goal of ensuring solvency, and the short term aim
of business cycle stabilisation. In the type of models that are now the
focus of macroeconomic analysis, the optimal speed at which debt dise-
quilibrium is corrected is very slow, and in some models some permanent
drift in debt following shocks is optimal. These results appear to be at
odds with the received wisdom in this area, which sees the control of
government debt as a much more urgent priority, and which therefore
severely restricts or rules out the use of ﬁscal policy for business cycle
stabilisation. To many, the embodiment of this received wisdom are the
debt limits that are central to the European Monetary Union’s Stability
and Growth Pact.
The contrast between the macroeconomic analysis and the received
wisdom may have a very simple explanation. The discussion above had
11Benigno and Woodford (2003) suggest one particular policy assignment, but
note that several other assignments would also achieve the optimal macroeconomic
response to shocks.
12The analogy here is with menu costs and price changes: if there are ﬁxed costs
to changing an instrument, then these may outweigh the beneﬁts of ﬁne tuning.
However if the size of any shock is initially unknown, then there will be costs in
initially delaying action if the shock turns out to be large.
16at its heart a benevolant policy maker, that aimed to maximise the
welfare of the representive consumer/worker, who in many cases acted
as if they lived forever (by caring about the next generation as much as
themselves). In practice, ﬁscal policy is managed by policy makers who
may not have the interests of this representative agent at heart (because
they do not exist), and whose eﬀective discount rate may be very high.
The worry that many have with using ﬁscal policy as a short term
stabilisation tool is that this may give these more shortsighted, parti-
san policy makers an additional excuse to neglect intertemporal ﬁscal
prudence. As an example, we need look no further than recent devel-
opments in the United States. The current administration in its ﬁrst
term introduced a number of tax cutting measures, which have lead to
a large budget deﬁcit. This deﬁcit will need to be corrected at some
stage, but at present there is no clear indication as to how this will be
done. (The tax cuts were either permanent, or are planned to be made
permanent.) One of the justiﬁcations for introducing these tax cuts was
that they would help reverse the decline in growth that was occuring
at the time. To the extent that the tax cuts (or at least the lack of
any clear explanation of how they would be ﬁnanced) are viewed as ir-
responsible, then short term stabilisation issues appeared to encourage
that irresponsibility.
Many would argue that episodes of this kind are endemic in modern
democracies. In the 25 years prior to the formation of European Mon-
etary Union, for example, Euro area government debt appeared to be
on a steadily rising trend. (See Wren-Lewis (2003), who contrasts this
with the lack of any similar trend in the UK.) The essential diﬃculty
is that balanced budget changes are politically unpopular, but that the
constituency that is mainly hit by increasing debt is future generations,
w h od on o th a v eav o t e .
Fiscal Rules One response has been the analysis and implementation
of ﬁscal rules that are either imposed on governments (as in EMU), or
self-imposed (as in the UK). Probably the simplest possible rule that
e n s u r e ss o l v e n c yi sa na n n ually balanced budget rule13. The detrimental
impact this would have on short term stabilisation is well known. Fixing
an upper limit on deﬁcits, as in the Stability and Growth Pact, should
in principle allow for more ﬂexibility, while retaining long term solvency.
However, this approach is problematic for many reasons. The limit has
to be qualiﬁed in some way, because there are bound to be occasions
when a country falls foul of the limit through no fault of its policy
13If either inﬂation or growth were positive, and there was existing government
debt, then balancing the budget each year would in fact steadily reduce the debt to
GDP ratio.
17makers. There may also be good reasons why a country may choose to
run a series of deﬁcits and increase its debt (to improve infrastructure,
for example), and so some allowance must be made for this. In addition,
the speciﬁcation of upper limits could still be consistent with an economy
gradually raising its debt to GDP level overtime.
Some of these diﬃculties are overcome by the rules adopted by the
current UK government. There is explicit allowance for debt to rise to
ﬁn a n c ei n v e s t m e n t . I na d d i t i o n ,t h el e v e lo ft h ed e b tt oG D Pr a t i oi s
stabilised over the course of the cycle, rather than in any particular year.
This in principle allows policy makers inﬁnite scope to engage in counter-
cyclical ﬁscal policy over the course of the cycle (and it certainly allows
for automatic stabilisers), as long as the cycle is symmetric. These rules
and their internal consistency have been criticised (e.g. Buiter (2003)),
but in many respects they do appear to represent an improvement on
crude upper limits (Wren-Lewis, 2003).
One interesting issue is whether targets should be one sided or sym-
metric. If the focus is on government default or forced monetary acco-
modation, then upper limits on deﬁcits and debt are clearly appropriate.
However, in most mature developed economies, the likelihood of default
is remote. Equally, with the gradual adoption of independent central
banks, the possibility that growing government deﬁcits will force mon-
etary accomodation and therefore hyperinﬂation is also small. This is
not to discount either completely, but it seems likely that an issue that
will arise prior to this one is intergenerational equity. The current con-
cern about large US public sector deﬁcits, and even larger projected
deﬁcits into the longer term, is not about potential default by the US
government, or that the Federal Reserve will suddenly start printing
money. Instead it is that large deﬁcits today will require higher taxes
in the medium to long term, and that therefore future generations will
have to pay higher taxes to pay for tax cuts today. In this case it is in
principle possible for the opposite problem to arise: that large surpluses
could emerge, which favoured future generations at the expense of to-
days taxpayers. Although this possibility may be small, for the political
economy reasons noted above, the recent experience of the Australiasian
economies suggest it is not inconceivable.
The diﬃculty with sophisticated rules and targets, such as those in
the UK (relative to EMU), is that complexity may be the enemy of cred-
ibility. This has been illustrated by the recent move by H.M.Treasury
to start the economic cycle two years earlier than previously assumed.
Whatever the statistical merits of this move, it has reduced the im-
mediate pressure on the government, and the general public reaction
has been extremely cynical. In addition, these rules remain much more
18simple than anything that might be regarded as optimal. We noted
in previous sections, for example, that optimal debt correction might
be far more drawn out than a single cycle, and that some drift in the
target may even be appropriate. Buiter (2003) makes a similar point,
from a much more wide ranging perspective. Thus simple rules may im-
pose large macroeconomic costs, but more complex rules may be open
to abuse, and may therefore not solve the credibility problem they are
designed to overcome. Wyplosz (2001) writes ‘The problem with rules
is that they tend to be rigid and artiﬁcial...The appropiate response is
to build institutions which create the proper incentives’.
Alternative Institutions An alternative to rules that has been ex-
plored by a number of authors is to take some authority for ﬁscal deci-
sions away from elected politicians. These proposals have varied widely,
in part because they have focused on diﬀerent types of economy and
time frames (they include Eichengreen et al (1999), Wyplosz (2001) and
(2005), Wren-Lewis (1996) and (2003) and Ball (1997)).
One motivation for looking at alternative institutions has been the
perceived success of independent central banks (ICBs) (see Calmfors
(2003) for example.). If our focus is purely on using ﬁscal policy for
business cycle stabilisation, then the parallels are straightforward. (In-
deed, the literature stemming from Barro and Gordon that is often cited
by economists as justifying ICBs, does not specify what instrument is
used to control output and inﬂation, and so it applies equally to ﬁs-
cal countercyclical policy.) The main problem with the ICB analogy
is how to separate ﬁscal stabilisation policy from issues of longer term
sustainability and equity, and also from microeconomic budgetry pol-
icy. Wren-Lewis (2003) suggests giving a ‘ﬁscal stabilisation authority’
as m a l ln u m b e ro fﬁscal instruments, chosen for their potency in in-
ﬂuencing the macroeconomy. This authority would only be allowed to
make temporary changes in these instruments, and might even be given
its own budget which would have to be balanced within a speciﬁed time
frame. Wren-Lewis (2003) also suggests that a good candidate for this
ﬁscal authority might be the central bank.14
One of the problems in such proposals is summed up in the famous
phrase ‘no taxation without representation’. Wren-Lewis (2003) argues
that this criticism is rather weak if the ﬁscal authority has only limited
power to temporarily change a few ﬁscal instruments, because changing
14Wyplosz (2001) argues that independent central banks also have authority over
economic decisions in the short and long term, because they can determine the long
run rate of inﬂation. However this not universally true: in the UK the inﬂation target
is ﬁxed by the government, and in New Zealand it is negotiated between Bank and
Government.
19interest rates has quite signiﬁcant distributional impacts. However, when
we move on to longer term issues that may involve permanent changes
in taxation, them the anti-democartic argument becomes much stronger.
Wyplosz (2001) counters that a Fiscal Policy Committee (FPC) could
i m p o s et h eo v e r a l ls i z eo ft h eb u d g e td e ﬁcit, but still leave to elected
governments how to achieve that goal. In a sense, the FPC could be
seen as representing future generations. However, whether society is
prepared to cede that role to an unelected body remains to be seen.
Partly for this reason, some authors have proposed bodies that only
have oversight over ﬁscal policy, without any direct authority. In the
UK, the audit commission does have a limited oversight role. However
Wyplosz (2005) and Wren-Lewis (1996) suggest setting up a body that
is solely responsible for this task. This is sometimes refered to as the
‘Wise Men’ approach, alluding to advice regularly given to the German
government by the heads of leading research institutes. If this body was
to provide authoritive comment on longer term budgetry policy, it would
require the use of dedicated resources. The UK government regularly
publishes a projection of income and spending up to 2050. Although the
diﬃculties involved in such a long term forecasting exercise are huge, it is
exactly this which is required for any serious analysis of intergenerational
equity. (It is similar analysis for other European economies, and the
US, that has lead to growing concern, particularly concerning pension
provision.) Any monitoring institution would require the capability of
completing a similar exercise. As no real world counterpart to a Fiscal
Policy Committee currently exists, both caution and political reality
suggest that the ﬁrst such FPC should have an advisory role.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In the modern theory of business cycle stabilisation, benevolant policy
makers can vary monetary and ﬁscal policy instruments to improve the
welfare of representative agents by eliminating or reducing the costs as-
sociated with price rigidity. We set out a very simple model in which
Ricardian Equivalence held, so there was no point in policy makers at-
tempting to inﬂuence the economy by changing the intertemporal pat-
tern of consumers’ income. Despite this, we showed that diﬀerent ﬁscal
policy instruments would have an impact on the economy, and that this
impact was not only distinct from monetary policy, but also diﬀered
between ﬁscal instruments. We showed that, as a result, ﬁscal policy
can have a potentially useful role in complementing monetary policy in
its stabilisation objective. (It follows almost directly that ﬁscal policy
can play a vital stabilisation role for individual members of a monetary
20union.)
We also cited recent literature which showed that this short term
stabilisation role need not conﬂict with longer term stabilisation of gov-
ernment debt. The main reason for this is that the optimal speed of
debt stabilisation appears to be pretty slow, and some recent studies
have even suggested that, provided policy can commit to using ﬁscal
instruments to stabilise debt in this way, some drift in debt may be ap-
propriate. However, this analysis completely neglects political economy
considerations, which may arise because the interests of agents in the
economy may diﬀer, and politicians may have much shorter horizons
than society. This led us to consider various proposals to change the
institutional structure in which at least some ﬁscal decisions are made.
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